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ABSTRACT
Whilst the literature classifies policy learning in terms of types or 
ontological approaches (reflexive and social constructivist learning 
versus rational up-dating of priors), we offer a three-dimensional 
approach to explore the relationships between individual learning, 
learning in groups and the macro-dimension. Our contribution 
maps most (although not all) lively debates in the field on a multi-
dimensional space and explores the logic of causality from micro to 
macro. To achieve these two aims, we draw on Coleman’s ‘bath-tub’. 
We map learning in the bath-tub by considering prominent studies 
on learning but also, in some cases, by exploring and drawing lessons 
from political science and behavioural sciences. By integrating 
findings in an eclectic way, we explain the logic of learning using a 
single template and suggest methods for empirical analysis. This is 
not a literature review but an original attempt to capture the causal 
architecture of the field, contributing to learning theory with findings 
from mainstream political and behavioural sciences.
1. Introduction and motivation
The claim that there is a causal relationship between learning and policy change is a classic 
feature of theoretical and empirical policy analysis. One popular textbook on Theories of the 
Policy Process edited by Sabatier and Weible (2014) refers to learning 80 times in relation 
to: the impact of collective learning (p. 13, see Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013); experiential learn-
ing clashing with preferred policy options (p. 31, citing Moynihan, 2006); organizational 
learning (p. 44, in relation to the multiple streams framework); policy-oriented learning 
affecting social constructions (p. 132, citing Montpetit 2007, p. 198 in the context of the 
advocacy coalitions framework); learning as mechanism of policy diffusion (pp. 310, 311, 
see Gilardi, 2010); learning and policy capacity (p. 401, see Howlett, 2009); and, learning 
as meso-theory adopted by the narrative policy framework (p. 243, see Shanahan, Jones, 
& McBeth, 2011).
We do not want to generalize from one book, although this particular one makes the 
claim to present the lenses on the policy process that have achieved the status of theories. 
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Other books contain chapters on learning, for example The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Policy (chapter by Freeman, 2006) and The Handbook of Public Policy Analysis (chapter by 
Grin & Loeber, 2007). Yet, when we go beyond references and empirical studies and look 
for the analytical foundations we do not find a systematic field (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2016). 
Consider these questions. Why would we expect an organization or individual to learn? On 
the basis of what model of the individual actor, can we theorize learning? Why should the 
process of learning lead to policy change? And, what are the effects of learning? Concepts 
and findings are not systematic, and often the studies on policy learning skirt around these 
questions. They document learning, but without building on the same understanding of 
where learning takes place, at what level and with what effects. Thus, the aim in this article is 
to provide some sort of conceptual architecture, and in this way to facilitate the cumulative 
progress in the field.
Speaking of concepts, we do have of course a strand of research on concept formation, 
mostly concerned with the types of learning, the difference between individual and col-
lective learning and the relationship between the process of learning and the products of 
learning (Bennett & Howlett, 1992; Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013; Grin & Loeber, 2007; Hall, 
1993; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013; May, 1992). These conceptual efforts provide the stepping 
stones for building the architecture we seek. The reader should use these references for the 
definitions of learning in public policy, plus Freeman (2006, p. 369) on ‘the essential issues 
that any account of learning must address’. But, let us mention two important points.
So far theorists of learning have done a good job in two directions. First, they have 
classified learning in types – this adds to the precision of the concepts deployed in empir-
ical research. Second, they have distinguished ‘different ways of thinking about learning’ 
(Freeman, 2006, p. 369), often using ontology as dividing line. Thus, we have the organic, 
mechanistic, positivist ontology of learning versus the interpretivist and social constructivist 
ontology (Grin & Loeber, 2007). To be aware of a concept and its ontological presuppositions 
is fundamental. But it is not enough. To go forward, we offer a multi-dimensional approach 
to explore the relationships between individual learning, learning in groups, and the mac-
ro-dimension. Our contribution is in terms of mapping some (although not all) lively 
debates in the field on a multi-dimensional space and to explore the logic of causality from 
micro to macro. To achieve our two aims, we draw on Coleman’s ‘bath-tub’ (1986, 1990).
We start with an outline of Coleman’s bath-tub model and explication of how the bulk 
of policy learning research relates to it. Specifically, we show the inadequacy of the classic 
policy analysis literature that treats learning and policy change as associated at the macro 
level where the actual processes that underpin the relationship remain obscure. The three 
sections that follow address each of the main bath-tub components. First, the macro to 
micro level examines the micro-foundations of human action and policy learning. Drawing 
on political and behavioural sciences we demonstrate the importance of heuristics, emotions 
and surprises for policy learning. Next, we move to how individuals relate when in group 
settings. Studies examining this micro to micro setting uncover the disruptive potential of 
learning, the importance of individuals in sense-making and the socialization mechanisms 
that often determine what lessons are adopted or disregarded. Finally, we move to the 
analytical region of aggregation – from micro interactions to macro settings. Institutional 
analyses, studies emphasizing the framing effects of organizations and cultural identity and 
memories all demonstrate learning at the social level cannot simply be ‘read-off ’ organiza-
tions and institutions with their own processes of learning. With conclude with reflections 
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on the utility of the analysis and the methodological implications of the different analytical 
dimension of the bath-tub. Note that, although we shed light on the different dimensions 
of the causal relationship, our word budget is such that we cannot explain how learning 
at one level influences learning at another level – see Witting and Moyson (2015) for this 
type of analysis.
Before we start, let us answer an important question raised by a reviewer of this article: 
what is ontologically implied by the bath-tub? Are you, our reader, buying into something 
when you see the literature mapped onto this analytical device, which is not without its 
critics? To paraphrase social constructivist language, we argue that the bath-tub is what 
a given group of social scientists makes of it. For some, this is the archetypical positivist 
template for explanation informed by Humean causality. It excludes holistic approaches that 
deny value to micro-foundations, and pins down the scientific enterprise to one particular 
type of causality and one approach to evidence. Thus – one could carry on – to embrace 
the bath-tub is to chain policy learning to the Procrustean bed of positivism.
Yet for us, in this project at least, the bath-tub is something else: it is a valuable heuristic 
to map the field. Our aim in this article, in fact, is not to address the ontological concerns 
and the debate on the positivist, interpretivist and social constructivist ontologies of pol-
icy learning (for this, see Grin & Loeber, 2007). For us, the bath-tub is a way to show how 
the literature populates the dimensions of analysis: the model of the individual, the group 
dimension, and the relationship between learning in one organization or sector, and finally 
the macro outcomes. This is a multi-dimensional way that is familiar to several theories of 
the policy process – indeed, in policy analysis it is common to refer to the micro, the meso 
and the macro level (where ‘meso’ means sectors or policy sub-systems rather than groups).
No doubt most of the authors we show on one dimension of the bath-tub would be sur-
prised to see their work on the same conceptual map as the work of others, who start from 
different ontological assumptions and cover another dimension of the bath-tub. But this is 
exactly our point: the bath-tub allows us to map the field and show where studies informed 
by a certain ontology or assumptions or presuppositions fall in the analytical space. The 
advantage of using a multi-dimensional map is to go beyond the dichotomy of positivist 
ontology versus social constructivist ontology. It shows the field in its entirety rather than 
breaking it down into those who stay on one side of the ontological debate and those who 
endorse other ways of knowing (for these wider discussions about ways of constructing 
knowledge the reader can turn to Moses & Knutsen, 2012)
2. Why dip a toe in Coleman’s bath-tub?
At its most general, policy learning is treated as the updating of beliefs based on experience, 
interactions, analysis or rules. Dunlop and Radaelli (2013) rehearse the main definitional 
features of learning: individual-organizational-social; intended, organic and un-intended; 
hard and soft; single, double-loop and complex; transformative of identities and preferences 
or more strategic and opportunistic. In terms of concept formation, learning can occur in 
five processes: improving policy to achieve governmental goals society-wide processes of 
enduring ideational adaptation to exogenous circumstances and sense-making, evidence 
accumulation and analytical sophistication inside public organizations, changes of core 
and secondary beliefs within networks or advocacy coalitions, and finally processes in 
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which governments use knowledge about the policies of other governments to re-design 
or innovate policy (Bennett & Howlett, 1992).
The actual learning process however is often left undefined with authors preferring to 
focus on the outputs of learning – the ‘lessons’ that are drawn about policy instruments 
or their frames – and outcomes – changes in these. Bennett and Howlett (1992) indeed 
concentrate on organizational change, programme change and paradigm shift. Neglect of 
the learning processes means that we rarely deal with analytical issues about how differ-
ent levels of the social environment contribute to belief change in policy. We address this 
challenge using a well-known way of exploring causal logic in the social sciences and then 
link it to learning studies.
Coleman’s bath-tub (sometimes known as ‘boat’) models the processes that link relation-
ships between social causes and outcomes as three elements (Figure 1). There are various 
interpretations of this model and we ought to stick to a simple one. For us, macro-to-micro 
concerns the micro-foundations of action. Micro-to-micro is the arrow that refers to how 
individuals behave when they interact in groups, for example a group of professionals in 
an organization. Finally, micro-to-macro is the analytical region of aggregation. This is 
somewhat in line with the notion that theories of the policy process consider individual, 
meso and macro features of the policy process.
As we said, this is simple and our aim is to map different studies, not to sell an ontological 
take on policy learning. There are more sophisticated ways to approach the bath-tub (see 
Mills, van de Bunt, & de Bruijn, 2006; see also Elster’s discussion, Elster, 1989). But, this 
simple approach allows us to lay out some important arguments supporting the claim that 
learning causes change.
How can we apply the bath-tub to the causality of learning and change? Obviously 
not all learning explanations will be Coleman-compatible. Some (like exclusively holistic 
explanations) do not fit with the bath-tub, or require additional analytical frameworks. Like 
all models, Coleman’s set of causal relationships may be accommodating a specific study 
only on one dimension (say, the macro dimension) even if the author of that study would 
emphatically deny value to micro-foundational analysis. It is the group of studies that we 
place onto the map that shows how the three set of relationships define learning, not the 
individual study.
Indeed, although this is not a review of the literature, it seems that the most famous 
studies of policy learning are empirically and theoretically engaged with macro-macro 
macro-
micro
micro-
micro
micro-
macro
macro-
macro
Figure 1. adaptation of coleman’s ‘Bath-tub’ (1986).
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explanations. To illustrate, in Heclo’s classic study of social policy change in Britain and 
Sweden the relationships about learning and policy change are at the level of government-led 
policies (Heclo, 1974). His study tracks down the dynamics of unemployment insurance 
and old-age pensions over the long-term. Having described inputs, processing of policy 
issues, outputs and feedback, Heclo famously concludes that the changes in social policy are 
part of a process of collective social learning that transcends power relations. These claims 
point towards macro-macro relations: variations of learning in the two countries ‘causes’ 
variation in policy outcomes.
Yet, Modern Social Policy in Britain and Sweden hints to the deeper causal structure of 
learning. For Heclo, social learning is not something we observe only at the level of soci-
ety. Quite the contrary, learning is generated only by individuals ‘alone and in interaction 
these individuals acquire and produce changed patterns of collective action’ (Heclo, 1974, 
p. 306). Thus, social learning has its own micro-foundations (from macro to micro) and 
micro-micro properties (interaction among individuals). Heclo describes learning as involv-
ing both individual cognition and the characteristics of the social environment in which 
the individual operates. He approaches learning metaphorically: a maze in which the walls 
are re-patterned all the time; where individuals are bound in groups acting together; where 
the group disagrees on how to get out of the maze and more fundamentally on whether 
getting out is the best solution to the problem; and finally where there are many groups, not 
just one, inside the maze, and each group keeps getting in each other’s way (Heclo, 1974, 
p. 308). This is not to say that learning is random. Instead, learning is shaped by individuals, 
organizations, the ‘cobweb of interaction’ (Heclo, 1974, p. 307) and the feedback effects of 
previous policy choices.
We can go further in portraying mechanisms of learning by turning to another classic 
author, Karl Deutsch (1966). For Deutsch, feedback goes well beyond the capacity to respond 
to the environment and re-create equilibrium. Learning capacity is generative of change. 
Learning is observed in actions that are produced in response to information. But, the 
information input ‘includes the results of its own action in the new information by which 
it modifies its subsequent behaviour’ (Deutsch, 1966, p. 88). Learning capacity is more 
advanced than the classic (‘mechanistic’ for Deutsch, 1966, p. 185) concept of equilibrium. 
In fact, a learning system is in principle equipped to pursue changing goals. Feedback 
in a learning system is a relationship between micro and macro – turning to Coleman’s 
category. But, the macro context is constantly re-patterned, like the walls in Heclo’s maze. 
Indeed, for Deutsch, feedback in a learning system generates a trajectory like the one of a 
zigzagging rabbit. The rabbit does not search for a homeostatic path, trying to get back to 
the old equilibrium. Instead the rabbit re-calculates the optimal trajectory in a cybernetic 
‘maze’ and, because of this, is capable of creative, unexpected changes.
Thus, the components of the bath-tub we are trying to develop existed already in these 
classic studies: micro-foundations, the group or network dimension, and the complex inter-
action between cognition and the characteristics of the situation and the environment. But 
who learns, exactly, in public policy? The agents of social learning in Heclo are eminently 
individuals belonging the administrative and ministerial elites, hence our micro-foundations 
should model the incentives and motivation of the bureaucrat. But, later in the history of 
comparative public policy, the notion of ‘social learning’ became to cover wider categories 
of policy choices that affect society in a broader sense. This is Peter Hall’s (1993) paradig-
matic or third-order change, a change that is socially embedded – then, it goes beyond 
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bureaucratic elites. Learning is collective sense-making, when a society at a certain moment 
in history converges through discursive practices towards a new understanding of what 
‘good policy’ is. This is yet another way of considering the micro-macro relationship – 
capturing the dynamics of public discourse and the ‘social’ widely defined. In this sense, micro- 
foundations direct us towards the citizen and how public discourse emerges in the 
interaction between elites and individuals.
We can then proceed and examine the components of the bath-tub systematically, draw-
ing on the literature that appeared since the days of Deutsch and Heclo. When necessary, 
we move from policy learning to wider political and behavioural sciences, thus contributing 
to filling the gaps in the literature on learning.
3. Establishing the micro-foundations: from macro to micro
Micro-foundations concern explanations of individual behaviour that provide the ration-
ale for what we observe at the macro level. This brings us into the world of cognition. The 
tradition of so-called rational policy analysis (Carley, 1980) and, with much less normative 
emphasis on the ‘rational’ side of things, Bayesian decision theory provide a simple way of 
thinking about the micro foundations. In a nutshell, (instrumental) learning is about using 
evidence to adjust (coherently) our priors to reality and behave consequently. Cognition 
is about reasoning on evidence. In turn, evidence comes from what we see or from the 
interaction we take part in – opening the door to the micro-micro analysis.
There are two ways to build on this. One is to consider this Bayesian reasoning our 
baseline and see what happens in the real world. Another is to look at this reasoning prop-
erty of learning with a sceptical eye and challenge the very claim that learning is about 
reasoning. Here we can follow Flyvbjerg’s (2001) lead and take a wider Aristotlean view of 
knowledge – learning can be underpinned by epistemic updates, but it is also informed by 
matters of practical techne or value-driven phronesis. Starting with ‘what happens in the 
real world’ and deviations from the Bayesian cognitive baseline, the most robust evidence 
for micro-foundations comes from experimental political science and experimental psy-
chology. Emotions, impulse, affect sometimes do not allow our brain to work slowly and 
follow reason. The mind follows heuristics instead (Kahneman, 2011).
In policy analysis, Simon (1955) and Lindblom (1959) set the early agenda on cognition, 
demonstrating that rational, deductive approaches clash with insurmountable computa-
tional limits. This story of bounded rationality is even more progressive today, when the 
problem is not lack of information, but its colossal size and availability. In policy the-
ory, these arguments concerning heuristics have been chiefly developed by Schneider and 
Ingram in the later 1980s. They observe that the ‘process of formulating policy ideas’ and 
‘the logic through which policy intends to achieve its objectives’ often follow heuristics 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1988, p. 61).
Consequently, our learning processes of drawing inferences from evidence cannot be 
systematic. At best, they are boundedly rational. But beyond that, experiments show that 
individuals learn following decision heuristics when engaging in problem-solving and 
design processes. Among these heuristics, the most important for policy learning micro- 
foundations are availability, simulation and anchoring. In consequence, the learning process 
is punctuated by heuristics that take us in the world of biases. It is ‘reasoning by analogy, 
search through possible examples relying on decision heuristics, or indiscriminately copying 
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policy based on prevailing fashion or limited knowledge and experiences’ (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1988, p. 78). Learning often is a matter of ‘pinching ideas’ quickly, rather than 
reflecting on the best available evidence in slow mode.
An important implication is that not all learning is beneficial to policy. These micro- 
foundational biases explain how learning via heuristics causes policy change, but this change 
may become a policy fiasco. The government and the regulators in general can react to this 
state of play by using nudging techniques to rectify the effects of heuristics (Alemanno & 
Sibony, 2015; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), although it is rare to see regulators that control for 
their own biases at the stage of policy design.
As mentioned, there is another way to build on the results of experiments. This alterna-
tive path rejects the normative implications of the language of bias and heuristics. How? 
By challenging the notion that learning is only reasoning on the basis of experience. From 
cognition we move into emotions – and some emotions are no longer seen as hindrances 
to learning, or, like Darwin (1872) said, leftovers from the process of evolution.
One can argue then that emotions are not necessarily this bad, fast ‘beast’ that destroys 
the logic of ‘good’ inferential learning. We know that affect and anxiety are not necessar-
ily antithetic to the diligent search for evidence and information. They can also facilitate 
information search (Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson, 2010). In cognitive psychology, 
the function of emotions is centred around information we need when we act on hunches 
rather than full understanding (as shown by the experiment carried out by Damasio (1996). 
Also within cognitive psychology, there is a body of experiments showing that emotions 
mobilize psychological resources (see Yiend, Mackintosh, & Mathews, 2005, p. 478 on 
arousal, anxiety and performance) and impact on cognitive processes such as semantic 
interpretation and attention (Yiend et al., 2005). To illustrate, emotions often motivate us 
to go deeper in our analysis of the situation or to pay more attention to certain features of 
the situation depending on our trait emotion. Generally, we do not look for information in 
the world out there, unless we have a personal motivation to do so.
Further, at least empirically, political judgements ‘biased’ by emotions and heuristics do 
not differ much from the rational, cool, informed political judgement, as shown by studies 
of the informed and uninformed voter (Lodge, Steenbergen, & Brau, 1995). And again: 
psychology and cognitive sciences argue that the level of emotions operates within any type 
of cognitive process. Emotions and cognition are not each other’s opposite. Rather, they are 
two complementary processes: Ledoux (1989) reports on cognitive-emotional interactions 
in the brain. Cognitive appraisals help us to distinguish an emotion from another according 
to Schachter and Singer (1962). Cognition can then influence emotion. If emotions are 
inherently adaptive and depend on cognitive performance (Izard, 2009), they can facilitate 
rather than hinder learning.
For us, the most compelling argument against inferential learning (defined here as rea-
soning about evidence and re-adjusting priors with coherence) comes from a set of exper-
iments that report that cognition can be fast-paced, linked to quick associations between 
cues and responses – or, in public policy language, between the stimulus coming from the 
environment and the behavioural response of the individual. These models of contingent 
learning are quite radical in their implications (Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2016 for a review 
and application to the EU). They show that often it is not learning that produces change. 
Rather, it is change that creates contingent fast responses via cue-outcomes associations. 
Surprise trumps experience. Priors do not change under conditions of fast, extreme surprise. 
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But the individual forced to choose quickly still sees that by choosing an action instead of 
another brings a better result. There is no time to reflect on ‘what have I done’. There is only 
time to use the fast experience of doing something in response to a cue; this becomes the 
only probe. And the subject carries on with the next fast probing mechanism. It is only in 
a second moment that these fast-paced associative mechanisms (i.e. associating a stimulus 
with a ‘correct’ response) bed-in and provide some feedback. This feedback in turn anchors 
cognition. And at this point the individual is in a position to draw inferences and learn via 
reason. We have come full circle: change causes contingent associations at the individual 
level, then feedback lays down the pre-conditions for learning. This does not happen every 
time of course and, thinking back to the seminal work of Argyris and Schön, when this 
learning is triggered it has a variety of depths (see Argyris & Schön, 1974 on single- and 
double-loop learning at the individual level). It is more likely to occur under conditions of 
crisis, emergency, ‘do-or-die’ situations of accidental heroes of policy change that only later 
understand what they have done. We have therefore scope conditions, especially surprise 
and extreme crisis conditions, for this micro-foundation of contingency.
In conclusion, our journey into micro-foundations reveals that individual learning pro-
cesses are conditional on heuristics; that emotions are not necessarily distortions and actu-
ally may trigger more information search; and that under conditions of extreme surprise 
learning can follow change, instead of being its cause.
4. Micro to micro transitions
Micro-micro relations concern learning mechanisms affecting individual A and individual 
B, and relations between individuals and groups or social networks. There is a colossal lit-
erature on both, and as we have seen the problem of explaining these relationships within 
a causal theory of learning was already present in Heclo’s insights on networked groups, 
within and across countries (Heclo, 1974, pp. 310, 311). Indeed, a year before Heclo pub-
lished his study, Donald Schön (1973) talked about government as a learning system. This 
notion of government as learning system is suitable to explore the micro-micro relations 
because it points towards the evolution of policy ideas within networks of decision-makers.
Ideas can come from advocacy groups or metaphors – for example, recently political 
ethnographers have documented that a particular chart can show up meeting after meet-
ing in Whitehall, and turn into the winning argument for a policy choice (Stevens, 2011). 
Ideas however do not necessarily move from the centre of the system to the periphery. 
Schön argues that innovation can already exist somewhere in the system, in many sources. 
Diffusion among groups is the process of bringing an idea from point A in the system to 
the centre and to other points in the system. This is obviously a lens that takes us to reject 
the notion of the stable state (Schön, 1973) and treat learning as underpinned by disruptive 
forces (Sabel, 2005). In theoretical approaches to the policy process, John Kingdon (1984) is 
the author that has theorized about the complex process of selection of policy ideas, point-
ing to a list of variables that mediate their acceptance or rejection in policy communities.
If we do not live under the conditions of the ‘stable state’, then the question arises how 
do policy-makers get to know what they know, and act in consequence? Sense-making 
is a process of assembling partial elements of a puzzle and using networks to generate a 
set of shared or at least not contested meanings (Weick, 1995). For Freeman (2007) this 
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micro-micro relationship is epistemological because it produces sense-making; but it is also 
bricolage because
piecing together is an extraordinarily subtle and complex task. It does not resemble the scientific 
task of appraising evidence and drawing lessons directly from what works best. Instead, the 
bricoleur in contrast to the scientist or engineer, acquires and assembles tools and materials as 
he or she goes, keeping them until they might be used … [N]ot only are tools selected according 
to the bricoleur’s purpose, but that purpose itself is shaped in part by the tools and material 
available. (Freeman, 2007, p. 486)
These observations on the bricoleur lead to the categories of special individuals identified by 
the literature – something we can only acknowledge here, but has been extensively discussed 
in studies of policy entrepreneurship and norms entrepreneurs (for an extensive review of 
entrepreneurs see Cohen, 2016 and on the bricoleur see Deruelle, 2016).
Thinking about causality and what comes first in this set of relations, in another con-
tribution Freeman observes that ‘learning is the output of a series of communications, not 
its input; in this sense it is generated rather than disseminated’ (Freeman, 2006, p. 379). 
Learning in public policy, for example in processes of policy diffusion involving networked 
actors across countries, ‘is interpreted as much as explained’ (Freeman, 2006, p. 380) and 
therefore the key question is about the point of acceptance where within a group there 
is a realization of what is known and why it matters for policy choice. Further, if there is 
a threshold or a point within a community of practice in a field of public policy (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991), this is not necessary the same point for society at large – recall what we said 
about Peter Hall and the social dimension of learning. Framing effects and their implications 
for citizen competence, and ultimately social learning broadly conceived, are the territory 
of behavioural decision theory, mobilization of bias across groups and target populations 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1993), and heresthetics.
Methodologically, social network analysis (Scott, 2000) including relational approaches 
(McClurg & Young, 2011; Selg, 2016); diffusion (Gilardi, 2010); interpretive policy analysis 
(Freeman, 2007); and ethnography, (Stevens, 2011) have delivered interesting findings. 
Experiments also feature prominently in this field. This blaze was trailed in the post-war 
years by Leon Festinger (1957) in his seminal work on cognitive dissonance. Inspired by this, 
in the late 1960s, Serge Moscovici and colleagues reported the results of a color perception 
task where minorities and majorities interact in groups, producing convergence. Here the 
most interesting difference is between conversion and compliance: a consistent minority can 
have influence to the same degree as a consistent majority. But since the former will have to 
work against the tide of numbers (which are of course in favour of the majority), its influence 
will have a greater effect, on a deeper level. Following Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux 
(1969) and Moscovici (1980) the minority creates a conversion behaviour and the majority 
creates a compliant behaviour. We can reason that conversion is a thicker form of learning 
because it implies a real change of beliefs. However, it is typically not displayed in public. 
Thus, conversion is learning at the individual level that does not necessarily lead to policy 
change. A minority is invariably the carrier of a somewhat deviant judgement. The members 
of the group may be converted in private. However they will be reluctant to express public 
acceptance of what they have learned from the minority to avoid the risk of losing face of 
acting in a sort of deviant faction in the presence of other individuals (Moscovici, 1980, 
p. 211). This theory of conversion was then re-defined by convergent-divergent theory (see 
the review in Martin, Hewstone, Martin, & Gardikiotis, 2008), by arguing that minority 
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influence stimulates a greater consideration of alternatives that was contained in the minor-
ity’s original argument. This shows how influence is not dictated by sheer numbers or pre-
vailing norms (otherwise the majority will always win) and that minorities often spread the 
seeds of change by convincing and persuading. Additionally, greater message processing 
(that is, reflecting on the content of the message and greater thought elaboration) occurs 
when the situation is un-expected. When the expectations about the messages supported 
by majority or the minorities are violated, individuals are surprised and this encourages an 
in-depth examination of the message in order to reduce inconsistency. This factors adds 
to the contingency of learning processes described above. Others have studied cognitive 
dissonance (Stone & Fernandez, 2008), looking at its motivation engine. Again we find 
that emotions may not hinder learning. For example, in experiments dissonance arousal 
motivates more action to restore consistency (see findings in Stone & Fernandez, 2008). On 
methods: beyond the lab, field-experiments are unlikely to be used due to ethical reasons 
(Martin et al., 2008, p. 376). However, minority and majority influence can be studied in 
real-life politics, organizations and minority movements (Martin et al., 2008, p. 376 citing 
Smith & Diven, 2002).
The debate on minority and majority effects remind us of how individuals with particu-
lar characteristics (policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs in public policy, or figures like 
Aung San Suu Kyi in politics) are key to learning in communities of decision-makers and 
more generally communities of practice (Brown & Duguid, 2000; Wenger, 1998). We already 
observed that often there is resistance to new ideas simply because they are uncommon, 
not because they are poor. By the same token, the policy broker is described (by Freeman 
[2006]) as a stranger because she calls into question taken-for-granted assumptions of policy 
(Schütz, 1964). Policy entrepreneurs may be pivotal in groups and tilt the minority-majority 
reactions towards an idea whose time has come (Rietig, 2014 on EU climate policy). Social 
network analysis documents interaction and reveals the position of pivotal actors in the 
network or between networks, but can also be used with ideas as unit of analysis. In this 
shape, it tracks down how ideas co-occur in different policy documents and speeches, gain 
currency over time and eventually obtain agenda-setting status (Leifeld & Haunss, 2012).
The fact that ideas and beliefs are diffused within and among groups in various patterns, 
such as emulation, herding, epistemic authority, persuasion, brings us to socialization. 
Public management literature provides examples of policymakers’ practice being influenced 
by ‘experiential learning’ (Kolb, 1974) on the job and more formal means such as contin-
uing professional development courses. But, in terms of policy learning theories, the most 
important dimension added by the micro-to-micro arrow is learning via social interaction.
For policy learning theorists, socialization is not limited to small groups. Indeed, sociali-
zation has often been studied with reference to learning mechanisms in international organ-
izations (Checkel, 2005). Socialization is a driver of learning because it can change norms 
and attitudes and anchor new ones (see however Hooghe, 2005 on the limitations of this 
mechanism in the case of the European Commission’s officials). Checkel talks about type I 
and type II socialization among public officers – the former referring to individuals learn-
ing the norms of behaviour associated with a given situation and the latter to the rightness 
of a norm associated with a certain role. Type II includes an emotional attachment to the 
job and is defined as ‘internalization’ (Checkel, 2005). This distinction is similar to the one 
found in social psychology between the cognitive and affective dimension of attitudes. Daily 
work and experience of routines facilitate the development of new attitudes. Meyer-Sahling, 
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Lowe, and van Stolk (2016) illustrate these points in their study of on how Eastern European 
officers learn ‘silently’, in type I mode, via interaction with formal rules and the procedures 
of the European Union.
The findings on how public managers acquire competence and form new attitudes is 
mirrored by the debate on competence among the electorate. Here the mechanisms are 
different. An important mechanism is framing. The literature on framing effects draws on 
experiments in different forms, from changing questions in a survey to the classic experi-
ment in the lab. Interestingly, in his review of framing effects, Druckman (2001) raises the 
question of the political conditions under which a framing effect causes competence or 
incompetence, bringing us to how the macro shapes the micro-micro relations.
5. Learning aggregation from micro to macro
This final transition ‘moves back up from the individual level to the societal level’ (Coleman, 
1990:8). Whatever the processes of cognition, emotions, attitude change and ultimately 
learning may be within the individual and the group, we need to scale up to the level of an 
organization (to demonstrate organizational learning), the meso-level (to prove instrumen-
tal learning in a given policy, for example) or the level of society (to make the argument for 
a change in policy paradigms and Hall’s type III learning).
Obviously, this aggregation problem – from micro to macro – is not solved by simply 
assembling groups, organizations and institutions with their own processes of learning. 
There is a vast body of work on how organizations, institutions and culture filter, mediate 
and shape processes of learning in this final transition. Organizational and institutional 
theorists have demonstrated that institutions not only shape learning. They can also ena-
ble or constrain, the core argument being that institutions lock-in certain forms of bias 
(Immergut, 1998). In turn, the institutional production of bias creates structural power for 
some agents or groups, and disempowers others. Organizations can also refuse to put some 
issues on the agenda, hindering processes of learning via non-decisions. With their rules on 
advisory committees and the role of science in decision-making processes, organizations 
like independent regulatory agencies confer or withdraw epistemic authority to certain types 
of evidence, thus influencing who learns what and from what type of science or evidence 
(Dunlop & James, 2007).
The organization is also the main location where individuals and groups experience the 
external environment. An interesting finding is that the organization and external environ-
ment boundary is fluid and constantly ‘enacted’ by organizations which frame and invent 
the external environment (Weick, 1979). Incidentally, the same can be said of the media: 
they provide the surrogate environment to people who are not there on the scene to observe 
the ‘macro’ reality (Lippmann, 1922). Thus, the environment acts on learning processes not 
just because it is something ‘out there’ but also in the particular ways in which it is framed 
or socially constructed within the organization.
At the wider level of society, learning is a dependent variable that generates long-term 
effects, and in this way it transforms into an independent variable, thus contributing to the 
historical, iterative evolution of institutions and political systems. To illustrate: learning is 
a dependent variable shaped by culture, memories, the social construction of nations and 
identities. Some features of this learning occur every day, gradually but steadily, like in 
Billig’s banal nationalism (1995). But then these features become sticky and hard to reverse, 
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thus shaping attitudes in the long-term. Putnam (1993) argues the repeated interactions in 
given historical settings teach lessons that are remembered for centuries, as shown by his 
analysis of social capital in Italy. Rothstein (2000) raises the question of how societies learn 
how to move from inefficient equilibrium of low social capital and distrust in institutions 
to an efficient one, avoiding the ‘tragedy of the commons’. He adds to Putnam’s and others 
game-theoretical explanation the variable of collective memories. These collective memories 
are not simply ‘given’ by history but can be strategically created by political entrepreneurs 
and political leaders: a case of power meeting learning.
Given the asymmetries of power built in and constantly re-produced by institutions, the 
puzzle is whether it is possible to learn how to overcome social dilemmas and still establish 
cooperation (Ostrom, 1990). Sometimes individuals and groups abstain from exploiting the 
free-ride option within an institution, or, at the opposite, accept an unfair outcome in a given 
arena. The explanation for that is arguably that society is made up of multiple interlinked 
institutional arenas (Kashwan, 2016). Institutions and nested games can reshuffle winners 
and losers across arenas, thus allowing groups to learn cooperation and solve collective 
action problems like the control of corruption and common-pool resource management.
6. So what? Discussion and conclusions
We have explored the claim that learning generates change in public policy by consider-
ing different levels of analysis. To generate an orderly discussion, we have separated the 
macro and the individual level. Following Coleman, we have investigated the transition 
from macro to micro first; then the relationships at the micro-micro level; and the final 
transition from micro to the macro organizational, institutional or society-wide level. By 
doing this, we have been able to focus on the mechanisms that operate at each level, and to 
situate a variety of claims about policy learning at the appropriate level. Our contribution 
is, therefore, an original way to explore the causal architecture of learning, to map the field 
in multi-dimensional fashion and to gain explanatory leverage from findings that have been 
originated outside the literature on policy learning. We argue that the main advantage of 
using Coleman is to go beyond classifications on the basis of learning types and differen-
tiations of the field in terms of ontological presuppositions. Instead, our approach offers a 
way to organize the literature. The caveat is that we have not presented a literature review; 
rather we have populated Coleman’s dimensions with illustrative and exemplary studies, 
trying to bring into relief the causal architecture that lies within the literature and distil the 
lessons for the research agenda on learning in public policy.
Another result of our analysis is the illustration of different modes of analysis and meth-
ods that are appropriate depending on the dimension of the bath-tub we consider. To 
systematically explore micro-foundations, we need concept formation (what is learning? 
what is cognition? what is an emotion?) and, turning to methods, experiments. In political 
psychology and neuro-economics there is an increasing use of brain imaging techniques 
(Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005). In economics, ‘introspection’ is a method to find 
out more about learning within decision-making processes (Earl [2001] on subjective per-
sonal introspection).
On the micro-micro level, we have reported on the findings produced by experiments, 
but other suitable methods are political ethnography, interpretive policy analysis, public 
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opinion analysis, and methods suitable for the analysis of diffusion. The micro to macro 
transition seems amenable to organizational analysis (including the empirical studies of 
sense-making in organizations, see for example Brunsson’s Mechanisms of Hope, 2006). 
Historical institutionalism process-tracing and methods of institutional analysis and devel-
opment have already demonstrated their potential for the empirical analysis of collective 
memories and how groups and societies learn the solution to collective dilemmas.
Finally, a precise understanding of the levels of learning and the transitions we have 
discussed can inform the design of learning architectures. Governments and international 
organizations invest considerable resources in the design of architectures for policy conver-
gence, fights against corruption and poverty, and administrative capacity. These architectures 
will not work unless they respect the basic logic of learning we seek to illustrate in this article.
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